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78 a 'veiled Isis' or veiled goddess, as he considered it to be beyond figuration (1993: 79 71). Although, against Kant's admonition, it could be argued that the demand made 80 upon us by the moral law (because it is unavailable to the senses) is always 81 understood analogically, via the veil of personification; having first begun by careful 82 consideration of the bare concept. Pierre Schlag further maintains that: 'Law is an 83 aesthetic enterprise. Before the ethical dreams and political ambitions of law can 84 even be articulated, let alone realized… aesthetics have already shaped the medium 85 within which those projects will have to do their work' (Schlag 2002 (Schlag : 1049 . 86 As advocate, negotiator, legislator and judge, a lawyer is already a writer and 87 orator and, as such, legal aesthetics naturally comprise a core element of the 88 anatomy of the legal imagination. As Robin West observes, 'modern legal theorists 89 persistently employ narrative plots at strategic points in their arguments ' (1985: 90 145-146) . In offering what is their perceived simplification of reality, judges are 91 also given to literary abstractions or flights of fancy. For example, in Tomlinson v 92 Congleton Borough Council [2003] UKHL 47-a landmark case concerning the tort 93 of negligence and occupiers' liability in which the claimant was seriously injured 94 after diving into shallow water where swimming was expressly forbidden-Lord 95 Hoffman took issue with the trope, 'a siren call strong enough to turn stout men's 96 minds', from an earlier judgment by Lord Walker. This instance of simple 97 analogical reasoning generated a conceptual metaphor that facilitated further 98 complex analogical reasoning from Lord Hoffman in his response to, what he 99 considered to be, 'gross hyperbole':
100
'The trouble with the island of the Sirens was not the state of the premises. It 101 was that the Sirens held mariners spellbound until they died of hunger. The 102 beach, give or take a fringe of human bones, was an ordinary Mediterranean 103 beach. If Odysseus had gone ashore and accidentally drowned himself having 104 a swim, Penelope would have had no action against the Sirens for luring him 105 there with their songs. Likewise in this case, the water was perfectly safe for 106 all normal activities' (para. 38).
107
Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council is widely regarded as one of the first 108 attempts to halt the development of a US-style compensation culture in the UK, and 109 the application of various literary devices-such as the powerful metaphoric image 110 of the Council 'luring people into a deathtrap'-carried considerable ideological 111 weight. The influence on law of stylistic techniques that occur in literature, for 112 example, whether at the phonetic level (as alliteration and rhyme), the grammatical 113 level (as inversion and ellipsis), or the semantic level (as metaphor, irony) cannot be 114 understated, particularly in their potential for ideological distortion. Far from being 115 merely embellishment or decoration, therefore, it is proposed that the subtle 116 application of an aesthetic methodology-augmented by imagistic language and 117 literary devices-continues to be fundamental to the formation of legal principle, 118 key concepts and judgment, without which law would lose much of its persuasive 119 force. 
The aesthetic is an essential component, the raw material, of human experience and 122 although subjective and beyond the remit of formal concepts or universal standards, 123 aesthetic expression represents a form of interaction between individuals and the 124 precognitive world of idiosyncratic established meaning. Through our senses we 125 encounter the world as alternately beautiful and grotesque, alluring and repellent.
126 The communicative power of this sensory information allows for richer intellectual 127 and emotional engagement with objects and concepts as they are in lived reality, 128 according to their sensible essence. We become more conscious of a multiplicity of 129 dissident perspectives and sensuous content from which to inform both our 130 individual life choices and capacity for moral judgment. This proposition can be 131 understood in semiotic terms on the basis that individuals respond to a diverse range 132 of images and experiences which resonate with a personal or shared history of 133 particular cultural traditions and practices. Our sensate relation to this network of 134 symbols and metaphors constitutes a productive force which, in relation to the legal 135 community, contributes to the formation of legal principle and judgment. 136 Whilst aesthetics is considered by legal practitioners to be extraneous to morality 137 and ethics in the formulation of law, the narrative form and figuration can obscure 138 an underlying structure of oppression as well as nurture a real sense of unity and 139 common purpose. The creation of a link between 'justice and beauty' is argued to 140 arise from the 'enriching asymmetry of [the] encounter' between law and aesthetics; 141 however, this encounter could just as easily produce an unjust or ugly connection 142 (Ben-Dor 2011: 1). For example, the aesthetic fabrication of legal truths such as 143 'equality of all before the law'-with the promise of impartiality portrayed as the 144 blindfolded Roman Goddess Justitia holding a set of scales and an unsheathed 145 sword-appeals to an innate desire for justice as fair, swift and final. The allegorical 146 personification of 'justice for all' gives shape and form to abstract notions of 147 fairness and equality in law-making and adjudication and, importantly, appeals to a 148 call for social justice and the basic human need to belong to a community of 149 equivalent others, which in turn nurtures a culture of compliance (Shaw 2013: 119) . 150 To maintain the illusion of communal cohesion under the law also requires a 151 sophisticated process of rhetorical dissimulation, which makes it possible to mask 152 the exacting and coercive ideological standards which, in reality, locate the subject 153 outside the law within the context of an exclusionary and socio-symbolic schema.
154
Through various speech acts and experiences, the cultural constituents of legal 155 identity are signalled aesthetically in the sense that a feeling for law, particularly 156 law as justice, arises from within the context of the imagination; a capacity shared 157 by all human beings in ordinary life. Austin Sarat and Clifford Gertz refer to, 158 respectively, 'the imaginative life of the law and the way law lives in our 159 imagination', and that 'here, there and everywhere [law] is part of a distinctive 160 manner of imagining the real ' (2011:2 ;1983: 184 (Puttenham 1936: 197) .
219
Ostensibly modelled on the world of experience, the production of imagistic 220 language by lawyers continues to be an issue of primary significance as it offers a 221 variety of semantic and semiotic possibilities for elucidating complex legal 222 formulae and authenticating contentious legal values and beliefs. As well as 223 foregrounding elements of connotative meaning via text and speech, the conscious 224 application of linguistic and figurative devices to insinuate aspects of meaning 225 constitutes a powerful emotive force. Without borrowing or stealing from the 226 armoury of aesthetic concepts to support the formation of legal rules and principles, 227 law would lose most of its persuasive impact; as the constant fabrication of a variety 228 of aesthetic expressions, mythologies, fantasies and mystical discourse enables the 229 construction of both social values and legal dogma.
230 Legal Aesthetics and Culture: The Metaphorical Masks of Law 231 A significant part of our vocabulary originates from metaphor. Even the Latin term 232 for 'tongue', lingua (originally, 'that which is produced with the tongue') was used 233 figuratively for 'language', deriving the terms 'linguist' and 'linguistics'. The 234 English language is replete with faded metaphors, for instance, 'the eye of the 235 storm', 'headland' and 'coalface'; and the legal profession has supplied everyday 236 speech with many examples, such as to 'plead poverty', 'standing', 'last resort', 237 'swear by', 'benefit of the doubt' or 'fruit of the poisonous tree'. Metaphor not only 238 performs an aesthetic function, it has an important epistemic role in facilitating the 239 generation of knowledge about the world. According to George Lakoff and Mark 240 Johnson, in Metaphors We Live By, they comprise a significant part of our 241 conceptual system by critically informing how we understand and organise reality 242 (1999: 3). Since ancient times, metaphor has been understood as the transference of 243 concept-categories from the literal to the figurative; where the properties of a word 244 or phrase comprising the source (e.g., shark) are transferred to an event, individual 245 or object comprising the target (e.g., lawyer), where the source and target are not 246 directly associated. In one of Aristotle's main works on aesthetics, the Poetics, 247 metaphor is defined generically as 'the application of a word that belongs to another 248 thing'; a rhetorical figure in which a name is reassigned to something else (1995: 249 21.7). Metaphorical language was customarily recognised as an important tool of 250 subtle persuasion, with which it was possible to move the audience from one locus 251 of thought to another.
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Metaphor remains a pervasive feature of language just as persuasive language is 253 a quintessential characteristic and instrument of legal practice. It is the most 254 important of rhetorical tropes and the principal figure in poetic works where the 255 imagination is creatively employed in describing the subject in terms of something 256 it is not. Understood as a disarticulation, it constructs a novel perspective by 257 transposing meaning between two semantic spheres without losing the original 258 connotation, causing an endless movement of meanings across numerous fields. For 259 the modern lawyer, the influence of metaphors, myths and symbols in their 260 deliberations has been described as unavoidable, as 'metaphor and narrative act as 261 ideological baggage carriers that transport messages without conscious discussion' 262 because 'meaning is constructed, and metaphor and narrative are the frameworks of 263 its construction' (Berger 2009: 262-266 According to eighteenth century jurist and political philosopher Giambattista 267 Vico, metaphor preceded denotative language as early humankind communicated 268 via images transposed into expression. Long-established figures of speech such as 269 'the mouth of the river', 'heart of gold' and 'the mind's eye' were used to recall 270 familiar images, meaning an image could be produced effortlessly without having to 271 be chosen or willed by the recipient. Such metaphors, deriving from a pre-discursive 272 level of existence relating to the body and characteristics of the human face, were 273 claimed to be able to provide a 'quasi-bodily externalisation' which in turn made 274 discourse appear (Riceour 1979: 142). Not easily dismissed as mere literary 275 embellishment, metaphor forms a significant role in how we think and communi-276 cate. Our ordinary conceptual system is essentially metaphoric in nature. As Albert 277 Camus wrote in his Notebooks of 1935-1942, 'feelings and images multiply a 278 philosophy by ten. … People can only think in images. If you want to be a 279 philosopher, write novels' (1998: 10, 210). Franz Kafka's The Metamorphosis, 280 George Orwell's Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty Four famously illustrate the 281 proficient use of extended metaphor to satirise, respectively, the fragile nature of 282 identity and human relationships; Stalinist Russia and the rise of totalitarianism; and 283 a dystopian society where totalitarianism had taken over. Metaphor is cognitively 284 important, it allows us to draw comparisons and amplify a certain aspect of a 285 particular thing, and 'brings something before the eyes' (Aristotle 1959: 3.10.6). 286 The deployment of metaphorical 'masks of law' (such as in establishing 'legal 287 personality') also enables the construction of legal identity by obscuring the true self 288 and replacing the authentic individual with an idealized representation. The creation 289 of masks not only produces a sense of alienation in the victim but has important 290 implications in terms of the 'plot and significance of the masquerade' (Noonan: 291 2002: 24) . 292
Much of English law is replete with lyrical and mythic imagery which resonates 293 from ancient times to modern life. Ernst Kantorowicz's The King's Two Bodies 294 traces the assumption of theological metaphors by English common lawyers for 295 secular political ends; in particular the ecclesiastical body of the Church and the 296 incarnated body of Christ. He explores the influence of medieval thought and 297 political theology in constructing a metaphysical image of the monarch, and begins Body natural and a Body politic together indivisible (Kantorowicz 1957 : 7-9).
318
The lawyers for the Crown equated the idea of the state with a perpetual 319 corporation insisting that the body politic transferred to the body natural of the 320 succeeding monarch at the time of death. Although the metaphor of the state as a 321 human body or corporation was advanced by leading jurists such as Plowden and 322 later by Edward Coke, an influential Huguenot treatise from 1579 Vindiciae Contra 323 Tyrannos argued that it was the people and not the king that constituted a perpetual 324 corporate body. Yet the allure of the monarchical body metaphor prevailed against 325 more abstract and complex ways of imagining the state. Once the appropriation of a 326 forceful metaphor has successfully established a foundational myth, such as the 327 'myth of the state' and the fiction of the royal body, the initial image of the actual 328 monarch recedes, is displaced and assumes a malleable fictional character.
329
Even though aesthetics is capable of elucidating a particular fact or difficult legal 330 concept, it is vulnerable to the prevalence of the irrational influences of myth 331 because 'it is beyond the power of philosophy to destroy the political myths. A myth 332 is in a sense invulnerable. It is impervious to rational arguments; it cannot be refuted 333 by syllogisms. But philosophy can do us another important service. It can make us 334 understand the adversary' (Cassirer 1946: 296) . Beginning his critique with 335 Shakespeare's Richard II and Dante's Divine Comedy, Kantorowicz presents an 336 illuminating account of how a literary fiction neatly segues into legal fiction. The 337 legal fictionalisation of the Crown, explored in relation to the medieval metaphor of 338 the king's two bodies, not only had an obfuscatory effect where real power was 339 conflated with symbolic power; it also exposed a gendered hierarchy of values.
340
The gendered construction of sovereignty was illustrated in the case of reigning 341 monarch Queen Elizabeth I, who wished to lease the Duchy of Lancaster. 
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343 the throne in the sixteenth century, and she was always described as a king and 344 never a queen. In an era where women were expected to be unsullied, submissive 345 and held no regular positions of authority in the church or state, the anomalous 346 nature of female sovereignty meant that a queen would be treated as a king and be 347 expected to exhibit fitting attitudes in her performance of kingly duties. Elizabeth I 348 accepted the metaphorical endorsement of misogyny, customarily referring to 349 herself as 'king'. In a famous speech to her troops in 1588 at Tilbury prior to an 350 invasion of the Spanish Armada she declared, 'I know I have the body of a weak and 351 feeble woman, but I have the heart and stomach of a king, and of a king of England 352 too… [that[any prince of Europe should dare to invade the borders of my realm; to 353 which, rather than any dishonour shall grow by me, I myself will take up arms, I 354 myself will be your general, judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the 355 field' (Neale 1990: 302) . As well as displaying her mastery of persuasive rhetoric, 356 by first appealing to the commonly held view of female feebleness Elizabeth was 357 then free to continue with bold masculine pronouncements using the metaphors of 358 heart and stomach, symbols of courage and loyalty, which demonstrated her 359 commitment to traditionally male virtues. Nevertheless, such was the power of the 360 prevailing masculine monarchical metaphor that Elizabeth felt the need to renounce 361 her female body by choosing, shortly after her coronation, to remain unmarried; and 362 thus ensured she would always remain 'king' and never be diminished to merely the 363 wife of a king. 364 Legal texts offer many examples of aesthetic contrivances in a variety of forms, 365 and illustrate the necessity of fictive idealisations in order to support the illusion of 366 law's self-legitimation. In discussing the practice of judges 'finding' the law as 367 more akin to 'creating' the law, Jeremy Bentham famously alluded to the creation of 368 useful fictions, by the priest and lawyer alike, as a 'coin of necessity ' (1977: 119) . 369 Undoubtedly, figurative language performs an important function, without which 370 many of law's abstract formulations would be impossible. For example, far from 371 being mere decoration, metaphor is one of the principal methodological devices for 372 constructing legal principle and a necessary tool in the critique of legal theory. To 373 misquote the famous speech of Viscount Sankey, Lord Chancellor in the House of 374 Lords appeal case of Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 375 462, at 481 (HL), if there is throughout the 'web' of the English law 'one golden 376 thread' that is inseverable, it is that the law has since the beginning of legal memory 377 formed a distinctive literary genre within which metaphoric imagery continues to 378 infuse and inspire the legal imagination. 379 
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386 which were accused of 'enliven[ing] the common law with metaphors and allusions' 387 (Bentham 1977) ; to the figure of Lady Justice, linguistic and imagistic devices are 388 omnipresent features of the lexicon of law and constitute the legal imagination. The 389 image of Roman icon of justice, Justitia, exemplifies the connotative force of legal 390 metaphor in the paradox of privileging feminine reason and judgment in the female 391 face of justice, whilst simultaneously repressing the political rights of women by 392 denying them legal personality, inheritance rights and public office until relatively 393 recently. This obvious irony was effectively subsumed under the overwhelming 394 performative force of the imagistic metaphor. The addition of a blindfold is a further 395 ironic gesture, since Justitia's eyes are concealed from view and her vision 396 impaired. Consequently, we are forced to question this representation of justice as 397 equating to either impartiality or arbitrariness, due to an obscured view of the whole 398 picture and a lack of foresight. For Goodrich, the particular choice of metaphor is 399 not innocent: 'the blindfold on the face of justice seems plausibly to have also 400 benefitted men through the limitation, mutilation… or sensory deprivation of 401 women. In a secondary sense, the blindness of justice can be taken to represent the 402 peculiar folly of common law in its dependence upon the blind reason of precedent 403 and the unseeing eye of an aural or auricular tradition' (1993: 296).
404
As psychological mechanisms, metaphor and irony have attracted criticism from 405 scholars of linguistics due to their equivocal nature and lack of specificity in the 406 communicative process. While aesthetic expression is subjective and beyond the 407 remit of any settled formal concepts or universal standards, it can nevertheless be 408 understood to represent a form of interaction between individuals and the 409 precognitive world of established meaning. Imagistic and linguistic metaphors are 410 not only related to rhetorical effect, they comprise significant conceptual devices in 411 law, as they have the capacity to repudiate truth-conditional semantics by resisting 412 the imposition of any clear, unambiguous or settled propositional outcome. 413 Although capable of eliciting a diverse range of alternative deductions based on 414 connectives such as 'if', 'and', 'or', and 'not', metaphors have the capacity to reveal 415 the basis for concept formulation and move from implication or inference, guided 416 by relevance considerations, to an explicit level of meaning. Encompassing both a 417 functional and artistic role, as well as providing beauty in form, metaphor plays a 418 key role in foregrounding elements of connotative meaning in the text. Although 419 legal knowledge is predicated on objective standards, absolute facts and realities, an 420 aesthetic appropriation enables the sacralisation of legal norms. Sacralisation itself 421 makes the reinterpretation and critique of normative standards more difficult in 422 practical terms, and helps to reinforce the mythologies which lend law its awesome 423 power. Much more than a stylistic figurative device; by acting as a semantic 424 signifier, metaphors produce the literal manifestation of figurative meaning in their 425 transformation of symbols into legal truths. Having internalised the symbolic 426 idealised nature of their origins, these legal truths are then able to mask their 427 normative origins whilst exerting enormous influence in the formation of popular 428 opinion and social values.
429
It is perhaps unsurprising that the judiciary is often of mixed opinion on the 430 application of literary language and, especially metaphors; since they perform a 431 substantial intellectual function while deviating from the typical doctrinal Social reality is constructed from the relationships and communications of 450 many different forms, ideas, oneself and other selves, and expressive language is 451 capable of imbuing any act or phenomenon with a multiplicity of meanings or a 452 single signification. The elucidation of an abstract principle of legal reasoning in 453 denying an equitable remedy to a person who does not present themselves to the 454 court with 'clean hands', for example, is instantly familiar because it uses an 455 image which is evocative and commonplace in human experience. Figurative 456 language not only has the capacity to shape to a complex thought but it can render 457 that thought possible. 458
The imaginative impulse and instrumental nature of the law are forever 459 intimately connected, and neither one has the capacity to maintain order and 460 stability or fully represent the dynamism of the law independently of the other. As 461 Goodrich suggests, 'law speaks in the mode of repetition; it is dogma and so 462 speaks in the manner of dream, through symbols, allegories, metaphors and other 463 species of irony and dissimulation ' (1996: 143) . Legal doctrine is unable to supply 464 definitive answers and certainties; rather, it generates more questions and 465 uncertainties. As law originates from and is an expression of broader social and 466 political relations, it constantly reinvents itself by means of a series of settled 467 linguistically encoded preferences; creating the rules which in turn determine 468 law's authority and serve to presuppose and validate the conditions of those 469 preferences. Since narrative and counter-narrative, heroes and villains, categories 470 of judgment, crimes and punishments are all produced by the creative use of the 471 legal language; constant vigilance is required as to how metaphors are formed and 472 the circumstances of their implementation to ensure their associations are always 473 legitimate and constructive. They have a compelling representational function, standing in for or 477 substituting the very things they merely symbolise. As metaphoric speech deviates 478 from the ordinary use of language and is capable of expressing higher order values, 479 Aristotle cautioned that a sense of appropriateness for the occasion, audience and 480 situation was necessary; adding that 'the greatest thing by far is to be a master of 481 metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of 482 genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in 483 dissimilars' (1995: 23.5). In pursuit of a 'good' or appropriate metaphor, it is 484 therefore incumbent on lawmakers to carefully consider how a particular 485 representation may communicate ideological bias; as it is likely, if not inevitable, 486 that the use of figurative language will result in some degree of moral ambiguity 487 when implemented by ruling authorities such as law and government.
488
The associative, expressive, attitudinal or evaluative meanings transmitted by 489 metaphor necessarily serve as an essential part of an underlying, invisible organising 490 principle; namely, a connotative order of signification. This wider referential order 491 also comprises legal fictions and facilitates the construction of 'myths', in the sense 492 of the legal culture's conceptualisation of abstract ideas and principles which appeal 493 to an aestheticised ideal of community. Most laws are not articulated in explicit 494 form nor are they reflected upon by the general populace; rather legal dogma 495 operates invisibly in the community, being uncritically accepted and shared by 496 others as practical or self-evident common sense. The engendering of social feeling 497 and a sense of partnership with others, when far from being partners or equals, 498 elicits a compliant self-conscious sociability which appears to legitimate, by failing 499 to interrogate, law's truth claims. Foucault describes 'regimes of truth' in which 500 reality is constructed, historically and politically, according to the singular vision of 501 powerful institutions of civil society which control and monitor the production of 502 discourse (1980: 131). The individual is reconstituted in relation to a particular 503 prevailing cultural or political ideology, within which language constructs and 504 contextualises the social subject. Structures of power such as law and the state set 505 out what is true and false, the means by which each is authorised, how truth is 506 acquired and the status of those determining what counts as true; and it becomes 507 impossible to be defined outside of these discursive formulations (Shaw & Shaw 508 2016: 33, 34) . In this way, law's narratives of truth are manufactured via language, 509 with the corollary that language is the site of struggle and resistance in which the 510 control of meaning is the winner's prize.
511
Ian Ward presents an eloquent argument for the inherent textuality of the law, 512 using the example of terror and 'terrorism', explaining how the use of figurative 513 allusion, hyperbole and metaphor is fundamental to constructing the 'terrorist', in 514 Law, Text, Terror (2009) . It is suggested that the cultural embeddedness of terrorism 515 can only be properly understood within the context of various aesthetic expressions, 516 mythologies, fantasies and mystical discourses (Shaw 2013: 128-129 . It is, therefore, unnecessary to 545 coerce the collective will into compliance, as people passively accept particular 546 ideological conceptions validated by the instruments of legal authority. Slavoj Ž ižek 547 suggests in Welcome to the Desert of the Real that the terms designated to 548 fundamental concepts such as democracy and freedom, human rights and, more 549 recently, the war on terror have been co-opted by law and mask their origins. These 550 'false terms' only serve to mystify our 'perception of the situation instead of 551 allowing us to think it. In this precise sense our ''freedoms'' themselves serve to 552 mask and sustain our deeper unfreedom' (Ž ižek 2002: 2). Accordingly, the 553 fabrication of such reality-framing untruths or partial truths, and their being passed 554 off as law's narratives of truth, means we lack the language to articulate our 555 'unfreedom'. Aided by a subtle utilisation of interpretative framing language, such 556 as 'military force' and 'war', it has been possible to create bias in favour of 557 evermore draconian and intrusive laws on terror; and consequently the lives of 558 individuals continue to be transformed by those agencies with power. 559
Whilst conceding the right of private organisations and governments to monitor 560 and hack at will, in relation to the activities of non-state sanctioned computer 561 hacking, law relies on the metaphors of disease (e.g., virus, quarantine and 562 inoculation) and criminal activity (e.g., theft, burglary and trespass) to justify a 563 range of harsh punishments. Even though theft, burglary and trespass have an AQ3 References Geers (2011) and Plato (1997) were provided in the reference list; however, these were not mentioned or cited in the manuscript. As a rule, if a citation is present in the text, then it should be present in the list. Please provide the location of where to insert the reference citation in the main body text.
